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When a contract is breached both US and UK law provide that the non-breaching party 
should be made whole. I propose a general principle that should guide implementation—the 
contract is an asset and the problem is one of determining the change in value of that asset at the 
time of the breach. In the simplest case, the breach of a contract for the sale of a commodity in a 
thick market, the change in the value of the asset is simply the contract-market differential; the 
contract-as-asset notion doesn’t add much. It becomes more useful as we move away from that 
extreme—imperfect substitutes, future deliveries, or long-term contracts. Thus, for example, it 
makes little sense to talk of the contract-market differential if the buyer repudiated a 20-year 
take-or-pay contract in the third year. The damage rule should be viewed as the price of the 
option to terminate. Parties might choose to make that price explicit, perhaps with liquidated 
damages. In the absence of an explicit exit price, the make-whole rule becomes the default 
option price. 
 
The paper considers the implications of this framing for a number of questions in US and 
UK contract law: (1) the relation between cover and market damages in the US; (2) the English 
analog: the concept of the available market; (3) the measurement date following an anticipatory 
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When a contract is breached, both US and UK law provide that the non-breaching 
party should be made whole. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides that “[t]he 
remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved 
party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed.”1 The 
English version, going back to Robinson v Harman, is “that where a party sustains a loss 
by reason of breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same 
situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed.”2  I propose a 
general principle that should guide implementation—the contract is an asset and the 
problem is one of determining the change in value of that asset at the time of the breach.  
 
In the simplest case, the breach of a contract for the sale of a commodity in a thick 
market, the change in the value of the asset is simply the contract-market differential; the 
contract-as-asset notion doesn’t add much. It becomes more useful as we move away 
from that extreme—imperfect substitutes, future deliveries, or long-term contracts. Thus, 
for example, it makes little sense to talk of the contract-market differential if the buyer 
repudiated a 20-year take-or-pay contract in the third year. 
 
Two caveats. First, I am referring only to direct damages; what are the damages if 
one of the parties does not go through with the transaction. Consequential damages and 
breach of warranty raise different questions.3 Second, the damage rule should be viewed 
as the price of the option to terminate. Parties might choose to make that price explicit, 
perhaps with liquidated damages.4 Or they might choose different prices depending on 
whether the termination was deliberate (exercising an option) or not intentional. In the 
absence of an explicit exit price, the make-whole rule becomes the default option price.  
 
I will use the contract-as-asset approach to consider some doctrinal questions in US 
and UK law. Framing the question in this way means that damages should be assessed at 
the date of breach. Ideally, post-breach facts would be irrelevant. This is not a new 
notion—the Privy Council so held over a century ago. The buyer had refused to take 
securities after the price had fallen. Subsequently, the price had risen and the seller had 
sold them at the higher price. The issue, said the Privy Council, was this.  
 
In a contract for sale of negotiable securities, is the measure of damages 
for breach the difference between the contract price and the market price 
at the date of the breach –or is the seller bound to reduce the damages if he 
                                                 
1 U.C.C. § 1-305. 
2 Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850 (Eng.). 
3 For my analyses of consequential damages, see Goldberg (2015, ch. 8-10) and Goldberg (2019, ch. 9-11). 
In both countries, courts have blurred the line between direct and consequential damages; see Goldberg 
(2019, ch. 9 and 10). 
4 For illustrations, see Goldberg (2015, pp. 10-19). 
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can, by subsequent sales at better prices? If he is, and if the purchaser is 
entitled to the benefit of subsequent sales, it must also be true that he must 
bear the burden of subsequent losses. The latter proposition is in their 
Lordship’s’ opinion impossible and the former is equally unsound.5 
 
However, the principle is not always honored. In both countries there has been some 
confusion regarding the role of post-breach information. In the US one issue is the 
relationship between cover and market damages. If the resale price has risen after a 
buyer’s breach and the seller subsequently resells the goods after the breach, some courts 
and commentators argue that granting market damages could result in a windfall for the 
seller. This is typically framed as a possible conflict between UCC 2-706 and UCC 2-
708(1). When damages are viewed as the change in the value of the asset, cover should 
be treated not as an alternative measure, but as evidence; the apparent conflict disappears. 
The cover-market relationship will be discussed in Part I. 
 
The English analog to the cover-market question is the notion of an available market 
in the Sale of Goods Act Sections 50(3) and 51 (3). If there is an available market, the 
damage remedy would be the contract-market differential. But the courts have had some 
difficulty determining whether there is an available market and, if not, how damages 
should be assessed. This will be discussed in Part II 
 
The cover versus market question of Part I raised the question—what weight should 
be given to a subsequent transaction when assessing damages? A related question 
concerns measuring damages for the anticipatory repudiation of a contract. There are two 
variants on this: (a) the repudiation occurs before the time for performance, but the 
litigation takes place after the date of performance; and (b), the performance was to 
continue past the date the litigation would be resolved. The US treatment of these 
problems will be the focus of Part III. 
 
Suppose that a force majeure event occurred after the repudiation but before the 
decision. Should the court take this new information into account? The contract-as-asset 
answer is straightforward: No. However, recent decisions in the UK have held otherwise. 
The House of Lords rejected the breach-date measure in The Golden Victory6 and a 
decade later the Supreme Court affirmed that holding in Bunge v Nidera.7 In The Golden 
Victory the probability of the excusing event at the time of the repudiation was low, while 
in Bunge it was very high. In both cases the post-repudiation facts should have been 
irrelevant. Part IV critiques the two decisions. 
 
  
                                                 
5 Jamal v Moolla Dawood Sons & Co [1916] 1 AC 175, 179 (PC). For a more recent American case 
involving damages for non-delivery of securities, see Kearl v. Rausser 293 Fed. App’x 592 (10th Cir. 
2008). 
6 Golden Strait Corp v Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory), [2007] 1 C.L.C. 352. 
7 Bunge SA v. Nidera BV. [2015] UKSC 43. 
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Part I. Cover 
 
In a contract for the sale of goods, when the buyer breaches, the UCC provides two 
alternative damage remedies and that has led to some confusion. Section 2-706 allows the 
seller to resell the goods (to cover), and reckons the damages as the difference between 
the contract price and the price at which the goods were sold. Section 2-708(1) provides 
for the market-contract differential. If at the time of a buyer breach the market price had 
fallen, the buyer’s liability would be the market-contract differential. But suppose that the 
market price subsequently rose and the seller resold the goods at a price greater than the 
contract price. Some commentators perceive a conflict between 708(1) and 706, arguing 
that allowing recovery of the contract-market differential would give the seller a windfall. 
The White & Summers treatise opts for restricting recovery: 
Whether the drafters intended a seller who has resold to recover more in 
damages under 2-708(1) than he could recover under 2-706 is not clear. We 
conclude that a seller should not be permitted to recover more under 2-708(1) 
than under 2-706, but we admit we are swimming upstream against a heavy 
current of implication which flows from the comments and the Code history.8  
Some courts and other commentators have joined White & Summers in their concern 
about a possible windfall.9 
 
Consider a simple example: Widgetco promises to sell to Buildco 1,000 tons of 
widgets for delivery on January 1 for $100,000. On January 1, Buildco breaches and the 
market value is $70,000. Damages? $30,000. But, Buildco argues, Widgetco didn’t sell 
right away; it held the widgets for three more years, ultimately selling them for $120,000. 
Citing Section 2-706, Buildco claims that the resale should be taken into account and that 
Widgetco didn’t lose $30,000 after all. Compensating that amount would mean that 
Widgetco would net $50,000 the $30,000 remedy plus the $20,000 increase in value), 
which would be a windfall. So goes the argument.10 
 
The widgets three years hence might well be physically identical, but they are not 
economically identical. At the moment of breach, Widgetco has lost an asset, the right to 
the net proceeds of sale on January 1. In this case it happens to be a positive amount, 
$30,000. The right to sell widgets on January 1 is not the same as the right to sell 
physically identical widgets at some subsequent date. Awarding Widgetco $30,000 puts it 
in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed. In addition to the $30,000 
it would still have the widgets, which would be worth $30,000 less than they were when 
                                                 
8 White, James J. & Robert S. Summers. 1996. Uniform Commercial Code, Vol. 1, 5th ed. (§6.7). 
9 See, e.g., Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 1083 (9th Cir. 1979, Tesoro Petroleum Corp. 
v. Holborn Oil Co., Ltd., 145 Misc.2d 715, 547 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 10 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 814, and Eades 
Commodities, Co. v. Hoeper, 825 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. App. Ct. 1992); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
Conflicting Formulas For Measuring Expectation Damages, 45 Ariz. St. L.J. 369, 398-399 and Jennifer S. 
Martin, Opportunistic Resales and the Uniform Commercial Code, 2016 Ill. L. Rev 
10 In Peace River Seed Co-Operative, Ltd. v. Proseeds Marketing, Inc., the seller sold the product (grass 
seeds) three years after the breach. The trial court used that price to determine damages. The Oregon 
Supreme Court reversed, using the price at the time of the breach, much to the consternation of one scholar, 
Jennifer Martin, (note 9). 
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the contract was formed. Had it in fact sold the widgets at the market price at the moment 
of breach, Widgetco would be in exactly the same position as if the contract had been 
performed (ignoring the costs of both finding a new buyer and litigation).  
 
After January 1, it would be free to buy, sell, or use the widgets. The subsequent 
course of prices of widgets (or any other assets) bears no relation to what it had lost at the 
time of the buyer’s breach. If it held the widgets, it bore the risk of subsequent price 
changes. Suppose that in the three years following January 1 Widgetco had, at various 
dates, bought and sold physically identical widgets. Buildco argues that some of these 
transactions are cover contracts. The prices of those transactions are as relevant to its 
damage award as the prices of Widgetco stock or any other assets it might have bought or 
sold in that subsequent period—namely, no relevance at all. The simple point is this: If 
the market price information is easily available, the quest for the remedy should be over. 
If the seller decides to hold, use, eat, or resell the item, that ought to be of no concern to 
the breaching buyer. 
 
If the market price were not so easily available, then the proceeds of resale might 
come into play. Rather than treat Section 2-706 as an alternative or coequal remedy, it is 
more useful to view it as a possible source of evidence of the market price at the time of 
the breach. The persuasiveness of the evidence from a subsequent resale would depend 
on the temporal proximity of the substitute. If the seller were to resell promptly that 
would be good evidence of the market price and the burden should be on the buyer to 
show that the sale price was unreasonable. Likewise, if instead the seller had breached, 
the persuasiveness of the evidence of the buyer’s subsequent transaction would depend 
on both the temporal proximity and the physical similarity of the buyer’s subsequent 
purchase.11  
 
Courts struggle over whether a particular transaction should be recognized as the 
cover transaction. The contract-as-asset framework suggests that this is unnecessary. Any 
subsequent transactions could be evidence of the market price; the only question ought to 
be whether a particular transaction would be good evidence for the market price. Here are 
two representative illustrations of how courts have made a simple question harder by 
looking for the cover contract. 
 
In Jon-T Farms, Inc. v. Goodpasture, Inc., 12 the seller, Jon-T, failed to deliver about 
6 million pounds of grain. Goodpasture would buy grain from farmers like Jon-T and 
store it or sell it on to users. Goodpasture’s damage claim was for the market-contract 
differential at the time of the breach (2-713); but Jon-T insisted that Goodpasture had 
covered (2-712). The court ultimately decided for Goodpasture (as it should have) but it 
took a roundabout way of getting there.  
 
                                                 
11 For a seller’s breach, the problem is framed as a conflict between UCC §2-713 (contract/market 
differential or market damages) and UCC §1-305 (the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if 
the other party had fully performed). 
12 554 S.W.2d 743 (1977). 
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There is no evidence that in Goodpasture’s mode of operation it makes a 
specific purchase contract in order to meet the requirements of a specific 
sales contract. The company maintains “position” records as to its overall 
operation which disclose the total amount of grain it has contracted to sell 
and the total amount it has contracted to buy, and its “position” is 
maintained in order to fill its sales contracts. The contract entered into 
between Jon-T and Goodpasture cannot be said to have been entered into 
to fill any particular outstanding commitment. The grain purchased is 
commingled with other grain. Although in the overall operation 
Goodpasture may have bought some grain to compensate for the 
undelivered Jon-T grain to insure an adequate supply to meet its 
commitments, there is no testimony that Goodpasture went out and bought 
specific grain to make up for the specific amount of grain undelivered by 
Jon-T. 
*  *   * 
Nevertheless, Jon-T insists in its brief that Goodpasture covered in March 
or April, 1974, for the Jon-T shortage; however, we do not find any 
evidence of such specific purchases for such alleged cover set out in the 
record.13 
 
Whether Goodpasture matched its orders to buy and sell was irrelevant. The court 
did not find any evidence of specific purchases for cover; it should not have been looking 
for that evidence. The only relevant question was whether any subsequent transaction 
was good evidence of the market price at the time of the breach. 
 
Cargill, Inc. v. Stafford14 is an extreme example of the confusion regarding cover. 
The seller repudiated a sale of wheat and the buyer, Cargill, claimed damages based on 
the date at which Cargill accepted the repudiation. However, in interpreting the Section 
2-713 language, “when the buyer learned of the breach,” the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals concluded that this meant time of performance (a mistake to be discussed in Part 
III).  
My concern here is the court’s assertion that the remedy would depend on whether or 
not there was a valid reason for the buyer not covering:  
If substitution is readily available and buyer does not cover within a reasonable 
time, damages should be based on the price at the end of that reasonable time 
rather than on the price when performance is due. If a valid reason exists for 
failure or refusal to cover, damages may be calculated from the time when 
performance is due.15  
The court remanded, holding that,  
[i]f Cargill did not have a valid reason, the court’s award based on the 
September 6 price should be reinstated. If Cargill had a valid reason for not 
                                                 
13 At 750. 
14 Cite. 
15 At 1227 (emphasis added). 
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covering, damages should be awarded on the difference between the price on 
September 30, the last day for performance, and the July 31 contract price.16  
So, depending on what had happened to the price in the interim, the parties could argue 
over whether Cargill had covered, if it had, which transaction was the cover transaction, 
and if not, over the validity of Cargill’s reason for not covering. 
 
Did Cargill cover? The court says: “The record contains scant, if any, evidence that 
Cargill covered the wheat.”17 And again: “The record does not show that Cargill covered 
or attempted to cover. Nothing in the record shows the continued availability or 
nonavailability of substitute wheat.”18 And so the case was remanded to determine 
whether Cargill had a valid reason for failing to cover. Cargill, of course, was (and still 
is) a major player in a thick market. It engages in numerous wheat transactions every day. 
It makes no sense to identify any particular trade as the cover contract. So, unless the 
wheat market somehow disappeared on or around September 6, substitute wheat would 
have been readily available. To even ask whether Cargill covered makes no sense, and it 
makes even less sense to ask whether the reason for not covering was valid or invalid.  
 
My point in both these instances is simply that the contract-as-asset framework 
makes identifying a particular transaction as the cover transaction irrelevant. The 
question ought to be whether any of the transactions is helpful in determining the market 
price at the time of the breach. 
 
II. Available Market 
 
In England, if a buyer were to breach by failing to accept goods, the Sale of Goods 
Act holds that “where there is an available market for the goods in question the measure 
of damages is prima facie to be ascertained by the difference between the contract price 
and the market or current, price at the time or times when the goods ought to have been 
accepted.” (50(3)) The same applies if the seller were to fail to deliver (51(3)). That 
formulation raises three questions: what is meant by available market, what should 
happen if there were one, and what should happen if the court should conclude that there 
were none? The courts exert a considerable amount of effort in determining whether an 
available market exists. This, I suggest, is unhelpful at best.  
 
In effect, the judges are asking whether the non-breacher mitigated or could 
reasonably have mitigated. If identical goods were available to the buyer at the time of 
the breach, the buyer could mitigate, if it chose to do so, and the damages would reflect 
the changed market conditions. This is the idealized available market. As we move away 
from this idealized form—substitutes are not identical, replacement would not be 
instantaneous—at some point the courts could conclude that there was not an available 
market. But that focuses on the wrong question. As in the previous section, the relevant 
                                                 
16 At 1227. 
17 At 1227. 
18 At 1226. 
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question should be what are the direct damages, the change in the value of the contract. A 
subsequent transaction (cover) would be possible evidence of the damages.  
 
After reviewing the case law, I want to make four points. First, there is great 
confusion about what constitutes an available market. Second, in a number of instances 
determination of the existence of an available market is irrelevant. After going through 
the exercise of determining whether an available market existed, the judge concluded that 
the damages were the same regardless. Third, in other instances the damage remedy did 
depend on the characterization—the market differential if the judge found an available 
market, lost profits (or something else) if it did not. Fourth, in some instances the 
question was not the measurement of direct damages, but rather of consequential 
damages. 
 
The modern discussion of the available market concept got off to a bad start in the 
mid-1950’s with two decisions regarding a buyer’s breach of its contract to buy a new 
automobile. At that time cars were sold under resale price maintenance (rpm), a factor 
that the courts deemed relevant. In the first, Thompson (W. L.) Ltd. v. Robinson 
(Gunmakers) Ltd,19 Upjohn J noted: “It is curious that there is a comparative absence of 
authority on the meaning of the phrase ‘available market,’ because one would have 
thought that there would have been many cases, but the researches of counsel have only 
disclosed one authority on section 50 (3). It is Dunkirk Colliery Co. v. Lever.”20 In 
Dunkirk, an 1878 decision, the court seemed to assert that an available market would be a 
physical place where buyers and sellers might meet—like the Corn Exchange or cotton 
market in Liverpool. Upjohn conceded that there was “nothing in the nature of a market 
like a Cotton Exchange or Baltic or Stock Exchange, or anything of the sort, for the sale 
of new motor-cars.”21 He considered that definition to be binding on him in interpreting 
50(3), but concluded that it didn’t matter, since he would have reached the same 
conclusion whether or not he found that an available market existed. He noted that 50(3) 
was only a prima facie rule, so that even if he had found an available market, it would be 
unjust to measure damages as the difference between the contract and market price (zero 
because of the rpm). Instead, he held that the damages were the difference between the 
wholesale and retail price—the lost profits.  
 
In the second case concerning the sale of a new car, Charter v Sullivan,22 Jenkins J 
found neither Dunkirk nor Thompson entirely satisfactory.  He concluded that an 
available market would require a possible difference between the contract and market 
price. “The language of section 50 (3) seems to me to postulate that in the cases to which 
it applies there will, or may, be a difference between the contract price and the market or 
current price, which cannot be so where the goods can only be sold at a fixed retail 
price.”23 Therefore, he concluded, there was no available market. Unlike Thompson, the 
Charter court found only nominal damages. I have written elsewhere why the analysis in 
                                                 
19 [1955] 1 Ch. 177. 
20 At 185.  Citing Dunkirk Colliery Co. v Lever (1878) 9 Ch.D. 20. 
21 At 185. 
22 [1957] 2 QB 117. 
23 At 128. 
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both decisions is flawed, but I need not go into that here.24 For present purposes I note 
that when the commentators confront the question of the existence of an available market, 
they often begin with these cases, despite the fact that they are nonsensical.25  
 
A generation later, the issue arose in The Elena D’Amico.26 About halfway through a 
three-year charter, the ship owner refused to make repairs, thereby repudiating the 
charter. The charterer could have replaced this charter with another one, but chose not to 
do so. Robert Goff J held that there was an available market for replacement charters and 
there were two implications. First, the direct damages would be the difference between 
the charter (or contract) price and the market price at the time of the breach. This was true 
regardless of whether the aggrieved party entered into a substitute transaction. Second, 
the charterer argued that it had suffered consequential damages—lost profits as a result of 
the repudiation. If a substitute were not available, then these consequential damages 
might be recoverable. However, since the judge had found that there was an available 
market, the charterer could have entered into a substitute charter and any lost profits from 
its failure to do so would have been the fault of the charterer, not the owner. The 
charterer could have rechartered and avoided the loss, but, for whatever reason, chose not 
to do so. 
 
In Shearson Lehman Hutton v Maclaine Watson27 the issue was one of timing. The 
buyer (Maclaine) failed to perform a contract to take over 7,000 metric tons of tin for 
about £70 million. Webster J, devoted a considerable amount of his opinion to a review 
of Dunkirk Colliery Co v Lever, W L Thompson Ltd v R Robinson (Gunmakers) Ltd, and 
Charter v Sullivan, finally concluding that there was an available market. He cited an 
argument in Charter v Sullivan, that there was no available market because the resale of 
the car had taken seven to ten days. Webster J noted that Benjamin’s Sale of Goods28 had 
rejected this argument: “It is submitted that the temporal test should be one of a 
reasonable time after the breach, given the nature of the goods in question and the 
business situation of the plaintiff; and that the opinion of Sellers L.J. is wrong on this 
point.”29 Webster J would not go this far: “I would not, even if it was open to me, 
conclude that the conclusion of Sellers LJ, that there was no available market because 
there was no available buyer (at all) until some seven to ten days after the breach, was 
wrong.”30  
 
Webster then proposed his own definition: “if the seller actually offers the goods for 
sale there is no available market unless there is one actual buyer on that day at a fair 
price; that if there is no actual offer for sale, but only a notional or hypothetical sale for 
the purposes of s 50(3), there is no available market unless on that day there are in the 
market sufficient traders potentially in touch with each other to evidence a market in 
                                                 
24 See Goldberg, Rethinking the Law of Contact Damages, ch. 6 & 7. 
25 See James Edelman, McGregor on Damages, 20th ed. ¶25-118-120. 
26 Koch Marine Inc v d’Amica Societa di Navigazione arl (The Elena D’Amico) [1980] 1 Ll Rep 75. 
27 1990 3 ALER 723. 
28 (3rd edn, 1987) ¶1294 
29 I don’t believe Sellers said any such thing.  
30 At 447. 
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which the actual or notional seller could if he wished sell the goods.”31 In implementing 
this, he asserted that this would entail “a hypothetical sale by a hypothetical seller of the 
amount in question of the goods in question.”32 The seller (Shearson) argued that this 
would require sale of the entire amount on the due date. That would have meant finding 
the price a buyer would pay for the entire quantity on the date of the breach; given the 
large quantity, it would most likely not be feasible for the seller to move that entire 
quantity on that day. Recognizing this, Webster J held that the fair market price would 
take into account the price that might have been negotiated a few days before and after 
the breach. He assumed that the “hypothetical seller of the goods in question, knowing 
that he would have to make the sale on that day, had begun to negotiate it sufficiently far 
ahead to enable him to make contact with all potential buyers so as to achieve a sale, on 
that day, at a fair market price for that day. Neither of these assumptions, if they have to 
be made, seems to me to be inconsistent with the objects of the subsection or with the 
application.”33  
 
In effect, this means that by implementing the available market concept in this way he 
was rejecting Sellers LJ focus on the sale on the day of the breach and accepting 
Benjamin’s. In practice, it meant that the market price would be higher than Shearson’s 
proposed standard—sale of the entire quantity on the day of the breach. The market price 
would not be a fire-sale price, but would reflect overall market conditions at the time of 
the breach.34 It also meant that the available market notion was irrelevant. If he had 
concluded that there was no available market, he could have looked at market conditions 
immediately before and after the breach and come to the same conclusion. Determining 
the market price if the transaction was for a small amount of the goods in a thick market 
is fairly easy. The less frequent the transactions and the larger the contract amount, the 
more likely it is that ascertaining the market price would require looking at a longer time 
period.  
 
The reasonable-period-of-time was stretched further in. Aercap Partners 1 Limited v 
Avia Asset Management AB.35 Avia entered into a contract to buy two airplanes for 
delivery in May and November 2009. The buyer repudiated in January 2009 and the 
seller finally resold the planes in February 2010. The buyer argued that 50(3) applied and 
that there was an available market in May and November 2009. In the interim, prices 
continued falling; the difference between November 2009 and February 2010 prices 
being over $3 million. Gross LJ held that there was sufficient evidence of Aercap’s 
inability to sell the planes at the earlier date and, therefore, there was no available market. 
In the alternative he held that had he concluded that there were an available market, under 
50(3) the seller was entitled to a reasonable period of time to go into the market and that 
the reasonable time period had not expired prior to the February 2010 sale. He did not 
explain how there could have been known market prices in 2009, but that the seller could 
not somehow access that market.  
                                                 
31 At 447. 
32 At 443. 
33 At 447. 
34 The court cited an earlier case, Garnac Grain Co v Fairclough 1968 AC 1130, for this proposition. 
35  [2010] EWHC 2431 (Comm). 




Assuming that he was correct in this, then the actual resale price in February 2010 
was, Gross LJ believed, the best evidence of the market price at the time of the breach.36 
Two points should be highlighted. First, the result did not depend on whether or not the 
court found the existence of an available market; the damage measure was the same 
regardless. Second, if he had concluded that there was an available market, that would be 
a significant deviation from Webster’s definition in Shearson: “on that day there are in 
the market sufficient traders potentially in touch with each other to evidence a market in 
which the actual or notional seller could if he wished sell the goods.”37 The year between 
repudiation and the substitute transaction does not meet that standard.  
 
Could there be an available market if the goods were customized? That question arose 
in M&J Marine Engineering Services Co Ltd v Shipshore Limited,38 It was further 
complicated by the fact that the buyer was acting as a middlemen. M&J, the breaching 
seller, entered into a contract with Shipshore (SS) to produce 1032 machine rollers at a 
price of $175 per unit; the rollers were customized products.  SS was acting as a 
middleman and entered into a separate contract with Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard 
(ASRY). M&J did not deliver; Field J held that there had been a contract and that M&J 
had breached it. SS found a substitute supplier for about $300 per unit and successfully 
renegotiated its contract with ASRY at the $300 price. SS argued that the substitute 
goods were acquired in an available market and therefore the damages were the 
difference between the contract and substitute price, roughly $125 per unit, about 
$140,000. In the alternative it argued that it should get its “lost profit” on the ASRY 
contract, about $23,000. 
 
Field J held that “an ‘available market’ involves a reasonably available supply of the 
contract goods and a reasonably available source of demand for such goods, and there was 
no such market for the goods to be supplied by M&J.”39 Because the goods were 
customized, he concluded that there was not an available market, even though SS found 
someone who could (and did) supply the goods. What would be the damages if there 
were not an available market? Field J held that they would be the expected “lost profits;” 
if both parties had performed, it would have netted the difference between the price it 
bought from M&J and sold to ASRY. He then made some minor adjustments. So, unlike 
Shearson and Aercap, the outcome did depend on whether or not the court had found an 
available market. 
 
But if SS had not successfully renegotiated the ASRY contract, SS would have been 
liable to ASRY for the market differential. SS would have suffered a loss on its M&J 
contract of the same contract-market differential ($140,000), as SS argued it would have 
received had the court concluded that there was an available market. The difference 
between the two outcomes did not depend on the available market issue; rather it was a 
                                                 
36 I would argue that the relevant price should have been the forward price in January 2009 for the 
deliveries in May and November. I would doubt that the February 2010 price was evidence of this.  
37 At 447. 
38 [2009] EWHC 2031 (Comm) 
39 ¶30. 
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byproduct of the court linking two independent contracts. If SS had been merely a broker, 
ASRY could have sued M&J directly for the contract-market differential. But SS was a 
principal in two separate contracts in which it bore counterparty risk. Its ability to 
renegotiate one of the contracts should have had no bearing on the damage remedy in the 
other.40 
 
In Air Studios (Lyndhurst) Limited T/A Air Entertainment Group v Lombard North 
Central PLC 41 the seller promised to deliver some used equipment used in film and 
television post-production for £100,000. After concluding that the parties had made a 
contract and that the seller had breached, Males J considered the damage question. He 
posed the question by asking first whether there was an available market. “The first 
question to be determined is whether there was an available market for the goods in question. 
That contains within it two sub-issues. First, it is necessary to ascertain what is meant by ‘the 
goods in question’ in the context of this case. Second, the question is whether there was ‘an 
available market’ for those goods.”42 
 
The buyer argued that the “goods in question” referred to new equipment and that the 
cost of new equipment would be about £500,000. Males J concluded, however, “that the 
availability of equivalent second-hand goods capable of performing the same functions in 
much the same way would constitute an available market for ‘the goods in question’. A 
buyer of such equivalent goods would be in the same financial position as if the contract had 
been performed.”43 
 
Males J then asked whether there was an available market for the second-hand goods. Was 
there a ready availability of willing sellers and a reasonable degree of flexibility regarding the 
timing of delivery?  
 
It is . . . of the essence of an “available market” that it should in fact be 
available to the innocent party so that the innocent party, who needs to 
decide what to do, can be confident that the goods it needs will be available 
for purchase within a reasonable time. Accordingly when the purchase of 
equivalent second-hand equipment is possible, but the supply is limited and 
likely to be possible only after a period of delay, it is a question of degree 
whether such availability is sufficient to satisfy the requirement for an 
available market.44 
 
In fact, after the breach the buyer no longer had a need for the equipment, but, as Males J 
acknowledged, that was not relevant. He did conclude that although a system  
 
would have been sourceable within a matter of about three months with the 
assistance of specialist dealers or brokers, . . . this falls short of constituting an 
                                                 
40 I have examined the question elsewhere; see Goldberg, Rethinking …Damages, ch. 6 & 7. 
41 [2012] EWHC 3162 (QB). 
42 ¶91.  
43 ¶93. 
44 ¶95. 
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available market.. . . . A delay of several months after which it was probable, 
but no more than that, that suitable equivalent replacement equipment could be 
located for purchase does not amount to a reasonably available supply of the 
goods in question.45 
 
Instead of 51(3), therefore, Males J had to use 51(2). He could use the value of the goods 
or the lost profits because the goods were not delivered. The plaintiff, having lost its argument 
for the price of new goods, argued for the lost profits, but the judge rejected that, asserting that 
the plaintiff had not established that its use of the goods would have been profitable. Instead 
he held: “I consider that the award of damages by reference to the cost of replacement 
second hand equipment would compensate Air Studios for the estimated loss directly and 
naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from Lombard’s breach”46 He then 
noted: 
I would add that if I am wrong in my conclusion above that there was no 
available market for the equipment in question, so that in truth there was 
an available market for equivalent second-hand equipment, the measure of 
damages pursuant to section 51(3) would be the same as I have found it to 
be pursuant to section 51(2). It is not surprising that the application of the 
two sub-sections produces the same result as each sub-section reflects the 
same principle. On the contrary, it would be surprising if the result was very 
different according to which sub-section is in play.47 
 
In essence, Males J admits that the whole question of the existence of an available market 
was irrelevant. The question that he did answer, even if he did not frame it this way, was 
the value of the asset—the contract—at the time of the breach. Determining that value is 
not so easy when the contract concerns second-hand goods, especially when the goods 
are a group of different items supplied by different firms. But that problem is independent 
of whether or not the goods are treated as being in an available market.  
  
In Coastal (Bermuda) Petroleum Ltd v. Vtt Vulcan Petroleum SA (‘The Marine 
Star’)48 the available market question again concerned the timing of a substitute 
transaction. However, it did not concern the contract/market differential; rather it 
involved a claim for consequential damages. The decision was complicated by the fact 
that the buyer (Coastal Bermuda) was selling back to back to an affiliated company 
(Coastal Aruba). Thus, as in M&J Marine, the buyer was a middleman, acting as a 
principal in two separate contracts: Vulcan-Coastal Bermuda (V-CB) and Coastal 
Bermuda-Coastal Aruba (CB-CA). Vulcan was an oil trader and both Coastal entities 
were part of a larger group engaged in refining. Both contracts called for the delivery of a 
specific type of oil, Russian E-4, in a specific time frame, August 4-10, 1991. Vulcan 
repudiated on August 2 and CA bought a replacement cargo of a different oil, M-100. 
The price in the V-CB contract was indexed to the price of West Texas International as 
quoted on the NY Mercantile Exchange (Nymex) for September oil futures—the average 




48 [1994] C.L.C. 1019 
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closing price over August 5-9 minus US $6.25 per barrel. The price in the CB-CA 
contract was the same indexed price minus $6.00. Liability had already been determined 
so that the only issue was assessing damages. 
 
If the direct damages were to be reckoned only by the contract/market differential, 
then they would be zero. But it was a thin market and if the buyer had to procure E-4 
within the time frame, the buyer would have had to pay a considerable premium, if 
indeed it could obtain any within that time period. Mance J found that “a replacement 
cargo would be unlikely to be found afloat at such short notice,”49 and it was, therefore, 
reasonable to consider the imperfect substitute, M-100. The damage claims were under 
two heads: CB’s loss of profit of 25 cents on its contract with CA; and the “loss of yield,” 
the difference between the E-4 and M-100 oil.  
 
The available market issue arose with regard to the loss of profit claim. If CB could 
have acquired E-4 before the delivery period expired, there would be no lost profits—it 
would have made its 25 cents on the replacement E-4. However, if it could not obtain E-
4, Vulcan would, held Mance J, be liable for those lost profits. “The lack of an available 
market may result not from any particular intervening event, but from a combination of 
market forces, a tight contractual delivery date and a late repudiation by the defendants 
leading to a situation in which no replacement goods are available.”50 He then concluded 
that since the parties, V and CB, contemplated that CB would make a profit on its sale to 
CA, the 25 cents per barrel would be recoverable. Four points: (1) this would not be 
direct damages, it would be consequential damages; (2) if CB were merely a broker, CA 
would have had a direct claim against V, but since CB was a counterparty to two 
independent contracts it would have had a claim against V and CA would have had a 
claim against CB. (3) if CB had been merely a broker, CA would have been able to sue V 
directly; (4) Coastal structured its business to keep the units independent for business 
reasons; it seems dubious policy to allow it to treat the units as dependent for this one 
purpose. 
 
The loss of yield claim had two components, although Mance J failed to recognize 
this.  The first component would be based on the difference between the market price of 
E-4 and M-100. The market treated the two as roughly equivalent. “E-4 and M-100 
traded on the market at about the same price with M-100, if anything, at a higher price.”51 
However, E-4 was better suited to the unique features of the Aruba refinery, so the value 
of E-4 to CA was greater than the value of M-100. Mance found the difference to be 30 
cents per barrel. If this were a direct contract between V and CA, a good argument could 
be made for allowing recovery of these damages; the buyer could argue that the goods 
were to be fit for a particular purpose. The argument is weaker when, as in this case, CA 
is not in privity with V if the V-CB contract did not spell out that particular purpose. 
 
                                                 
49 At 1025. 
50 At 1025. 
51 At 1031. 
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In Fulton Shipping Inc of Panama v Globalia Business Travel S.A.U. (The New 
Flamenco)52 the charterer and owner of the New Flamenco, a small cruise ship, were 
negotiating an extension of the charter period and reached an oral agreement for a two-
year extension. The charterer refused to sign and maintained that it could redeliver on the 
preexisting termination date. The owner disagreed, arguing that an agreement existed and 
the charterer had anticipatorily repudiated that agreement. The arbitrator found in favor 
of the owner on the liability question. The problem arose in assessing damages. The 
owner claimed that it would have earned €7,558,375 had the charter been performed for 
the two years. Shortly after the repudiation the New Flamenco was sold for $23,765,000. 
Less than a year later Lehman Brothers imploded and the market for ships collapsed. The 
arbitrator found that by November 2009 (the end date for the contract extension) the 
ship’s market value had fallen to $7,000,000.  
 
The question confronting the arbitrator, and the subsequent justices, was: How, if 
at all, should the fall in value of the ship be taken into account in determining damages? 
The charterer argued that the breach caused the sale and the sale mitigated the damages. 
In effect, it suggested, that by breaching it did the owner a favor; by causing him to sell 
before the Crash, the owner saved over $16 million. The arbitrator agreed. Because that 
saving was so much greater than the foregone earnings, he awarded nothing to the owner. 
In the High Court Popplewell J rejected the arbitrator’s conclusion; he, in turn, was 
reversed by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court reversed again, rejecting the 
argument that the sale of the vessel mitigated the damages. 
All the judges, invoking The Elena D’Amico, agreed that if there were an 
“available market” the damage measure would be the difference between the market rate 
and the charter rate. If there were an available market and the owner chose not to 
recharter, liability would still be based on the market rate. A failure to do so would not 
constitute a failure to mitigate since the losses would be the result of an independent 
decision not to recharter. In the Court of Appeal Longmore J said: “An important 
question in this area of the law is whether there is an available market. . . . A decision to 
speculate on the market rather than buying in (or selling) at the date of the breach did not 
‘arise’ from the contract but from the innocent party’s decision not to avail himself of the 
available market.” 53 
But what if, as the arbitrator concluded, there were not an “available market”? 
Rather than recognizing that the decision to sell was independent of the breach, 
Longmore J argued that the sale of the vessel mitigated damages, He concluded that the 
results for the available market did not hold if no such market were available: 
[T]he prima facie measure of loss in hire contracts is the difference 
between the contractual hire and the cost of earning that hire (crew wages, 
cost of fuel etc).  But it will not usually be reasonable for the shipowner to 
claim that prima facie measure if he is able to mitigate that loss by trading 
his vessel if opportunities to trade that vessel arise.  If he does so trade the 
                                                 
52 [2015] EWCA Civ 1299 (Court of Appeal); [2017] 2 C.L.C. 58 (Supreme Court). 
53 Ct of Appeal at ¶ 24. 
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vessel, he may make additional losses or additional profits but, in either 
event, they should be taken into account.54  
The Supreme Court concluded that the breach did not cause the sale of the vessel, 
and, therefore, that the sale did not mitigate the damages.  
 
The repudiation resulted in a prospective loss of income for a period of 
about two years. Yet, there was nothing about the premature termination 
of the charterparty which made it necessary to sell the vessel, either at all 
or at any particular time. Indeed, it could have been sold during the term 
of the charterparty. If the owners decide to sell the vessel, whether before 
or after termination of the charterparty, they are making a commercial 
decision at their own risk about the disposal of an interest in the vessel 
which was no part of the subject matter of the charterparty and had 
nothing to do with the charterers.55  
 
The relevant concern, it argued, was the difference between the projected income 
streams with and without the charter. That was unaffected by the sale of the vessel.  
 
In the absence of an available market, the measure of the loss is the 
difference between the contract rate and what was or ought reasonably to 
have been earned from employment of the vessel under shorter 
charterparties, as for example on the spot market. The relevant mitigation 
in that context is the acquisition of an income stream alternative to the 
income stream under the original charterparty. The sale of the vessel was 
not itself an act of mitigation because it was incapable of mitigating the 
loss of the income stream. 56 
 
In fact, the mitigation took a different form. The owner did not enter into shorter 
charters on the spot market. Rather, it sold the vessel to a new owner who, apparently, did 
not charter the vessel to others; instead, it used the vessel for its own purposes. 
Conceptually, the purchase price could be broken down into two pieces—the first two 
years (the charter period) and the rest of the vessel’s expected life. If the buyer expected 
to immediately replace the charter at the current market rate (perhaps because the new 
owner planned on using the vessel immediately itself) then the price would reflect that. 
That piece would have been valuable to the buyer and that value would have been 
captured in the sale price. The value of the vessel would have been about the same with 
and without the charter and damages would have been close to zero. At the other 
extreme, if the new owner had anticipated that the ship would remain idle for the full two 
years, it would have paid nothing for the first piece. The relevant question then becomes 
what would have been the expected period of time the vessel would remain idle. 
Unfortunately, none of the judges considered whether the owner could or did use the 
vessel in the two-year period. 
                                                 
54 Ct of Appeal at ¶ 25. 
55 Supreme Ct at 70. 
56 Supreme Ct at 71. 




The arbitrator found that had the vessel remained idle for the entire two years, the 
damages would have been €7,558,375. Multiplying that number by the fraction of time 
that the vessel was expected to remain idle would provide a good approximation of the 
owner’s damages. If, as is plausible, the expected period of idleness were considerably 
less than two years, the damages would be reduced accordingly. Whether that approach 
would give a better picture of the damages than the rates for shorter charter parties on the 
spot market should have been the relevant question. What happened to the vessel after the 
owner sold the vessel—whether the shipping market changed, the ship sank, or it was 
resold—would be irrelevant.  
 
The upshot of this review of the case law is that courts should not waste their time 
arguing about the existence of an available market. If the plaintiff were to argue that it 
suffered consequential damages because of the seller’s failure to deliver (as in the Elena 
D’Amico) then the question is whether the plaintiff could have entered into an alternative 
transaction that would have avoided those consequences. For assessing direct damages, 
the relevant concern is the change in the value of the contract at the time of the breach. 
For a thick market, like for cotton or grain, that is straightforward. As we move away 
from that extreme the measurement problems become more difficult. But labeling the 
problem as one of whether there existed an available market does nothing to resolve the 
question. 
 
III. Anticipatory Repudiation 
 
Following an anticipatory breach there is a temporal gap between acceptance of that 
breach and final disposition of the case. The damage remedy should be reckoned at the 
point that the repudiation was accepted, or should have been accepted. If the court’s 
decision would be made after the date performance was due, this just adds two wrinkles 
to the analysis of the simple breach problem of Part I.  If, however, performance were 
supposed to continue beyond the decision date, the problem becomes more complicated. 
The contract-as-asset framework should play a larger role. Part III A considers the first 
problem; Part III B considers the second. 
 
A. Performance Due Before Decision 
 
Suppose that a contract calls for delivery of 1,000 widgets on December 1 at a price 
of $1/widget, but the seller repudiates (and the repudiation is accepted) on June 1. If the 
court were to decide the case after December 1, the court would have access to all post-
repudiation information. Some courts and commentators argue that damage assessment 
should take into account that post-repudiation evidence and, therefore, the assessment 
should be made using the market price at the time of performance (December 1).57 Recall 
                                                 
57 See, for example, Hess Energy, Inc. v. Lightning Oil Co., Ltd. 338 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 2003). The White & 
Summers treatise enthusiastically endorses that view. Commenting on that decision, the treatise states: “In 
affirming Hess’ jury verdict . . . the Fourth Circuit agrees with our interpretation and arguments . . . for the 
proposition that 2-713 measures the contract market difference at the time of delivery not at time of 
repudiation in a repudiation case. Hurray for Judge Niemeyer.” (§7.6) 
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the discussion of Cargill, Inc. v. Stafford in Part I. The question there, like here, was 
whether the damages should be measured at the time the repudiation was accepted or at 
the date at which performance was to take place. The court made the answer depend on a 
nonsensical question—whether Cargill had covered and, if not, whether it had a valid 
reason for not covering. Since Cargill engages in frequent wheat transactions it made no 
sense to attempt to identify a particular one as a cover transaction. 
 
The contract-as-asset approach suggests that the change in the value of the asset 
occurred at the time the repudiation was accepted (June 1). But what price on  June 1? Is 
it the current price of widgets? Economically, a June 1 widget is different from a 
December 1 widget. Ideally, we would want to find the June 1 price of widgets for 
delivery on December 1. That is, the appropriate price is not the spot price, but the 
forward price. Professor Jackson argued decades ago that “contract law presumptively 
should adopt a general rule that an aggrieved buyer should cover at the forward price as 
of the date of the repudiation.”58 He used Oloffson v Coomer59 to illustrate his argument.  
 
I agree with Jackson that this would be the appropriate default rule. However, a 
closer look at Oloffson suggests a bit of caution is in order. A farmer (Coomer) promised 
in April to sell 40,000 bushels of corn to a grain dealer for delivery in October and 
December. However, in June Coomer informed Oloffson that, because the season had 
been too wet, he would not be planting any corn. The contract price was about $1.12 per 
bushel and the price for future delivery at that time was $1.16. Oloffson ultimately 
purchased corn at much higher prices after the delivery dates had passed ($1.35 and 
$1.49) and argued that its damages should be based on those prices. The court found that, 
given the nature of the market, a commercially reasonable time to await performance was 
less than a day. The court affirmed the trial court’s use of the forward price at the time of 
repudiation ($1.16) when calculating damages.  
 
 Why my caution? The court noted that Oloffson had argued that he “adhered to a 
usage of trade that permitted his customers to cancel the contract for a future delivery of 
grain by making known to him a desire to cancel and paying to him the difference 
between the contract and market price on the day of cancellation.”60 That is, damages 
would be based on the spot price. But because Coomer had failed to give notice, Oloffson 
argued that Coomer could not take advantage of the rule and therefore that damages 
should be measured by the price at the dates of performance ($1.35 and $1.49). The court 
rejected this argument, not because it was a non sequitur (which it was), but because, it 
claimed, Coomer did not know of the alleged usage, and good faith required that 
Oloffson inform him of that usage.61  
 
                                                 
58 At 81-82. 
59 296 N.E.2d 871 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). 
60 At 875 (emphasis added). 
61 Remarkably, White & Summers get this completely wrong. Their preference was for time of 
performance. They reluctantly concede that “[t]he outcome of the case can be defended only on the ground 
that the contract was implicitly modified by the trade usage that prevailed in the corn market.” (§ 7-3)  But, 
as noted, the court rejected the trade usage (spot price) and chose instead the forward price. White & 
Summers’ preferred outcome, price at the time of performance, was not even in the running. 
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 To call this a trade usage is an understatement. The rule today is, no doubt, the same 
or similar to what it was when Oloffson was decided: “cancel the defaulted portion of the 
contract at fair market value based on the close of the market the next business day.”62 
So, it appears that the standard rule in the grain trade (when courts are willing to 
recognize it) is to use the spot price, not the forward price. This does not mean that 
Jackson and I are wrong to prefer use of the forward price at the time of the repudiation 
as the default rule. Determination of the spot price in many markets might be a lot easier 
than determining the forward price. That was most likely true in the next case to be 
discussed. 
 
In Cosden Oil & Chemical Co. v. Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft,63 Cosden, a 
producer of polystyrene, promised to deliver the product over a period of time to Helm, a 
trader. It delivered some, but because of production problems, it cancelled the remaining 
orders. The jury found that Cosden had anticipatorily repudiated, and awarded Helm 
damages based on the difference between the contract price and the market price at a 
commercially reasonable time after Cosden repudiated. The court used the spot price—
there was no discussion of using the forward price instead. Polystyrene prices had risen 
between the time of the repudiation and the date of performance. Helm, being a trader, 
engaged in a number of transactions in the period between the repudiation and the 
decision. Each party claimed that specific purchases by Helm in that period were cover 
transactions, Helm choosing those close to the performance date (the higher price) and 
Cosden those closer to the repudiation date. The jury concluded that none were for cover; 
the court, treating this as a fact question, upheld the finding. It is not surprising that the 
parties would identify the cover contracts that were most favorable to them. What is 
unfortunate is that this would be treated as a fact question. Helms, like Cargill, was a 
trader entering into numerous transactions; none should be treated as the cover 
transaction. The only question should have been whether any of them provided good 
evidence of the price at the time of the repudiation. 
 
I do not mean to underestimate the difficulty in determining the damages. Problems 
existed even in the fairly thick markets I have discussed here and in Part I. And if the 
market were thin there would be further difficulties. In Laredo Hides Co., Inc. v. H & H 
Meat Products Co., Inc.,64 for example, the contract was a nine-month, variable output 
contract for all the hides H&H produced as a byproduct of its meatpacking business. The 
court found that the seller had repudiated. Laredo claimed that because hides decomposed 
with age, it had to take the hides on a month-to-month basis. To determine the damages 
the court used the actual hide production of H&H in each month and applied the then 
current market price. Although that required looking at post-repudiation data, it might 
have been a reasonable method for determining the change in the value of the contract. 
The complexity is ratcheted up when dealing with long-term agreements, the subject of 
Part III. B.  
                                                 
62 NAT’L GRAIN & FEED ASS’N, NGFA GRAIN TRADE RULES 28(A)(3) (2017), 
https://cb4q22fdswq370gsj3m681um-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017-Grain-Trade-
Rules.pdf. 
63 736 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1984). 
64 513 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 




B. Long-Term Contract 
 
If a buyer were to repudiate a twenty-year contract in year three, how should 
damages be reckoned? Often neither the price nor the quantity is fixed. The price might 
be indexed or subject to renegotiation. The buyer (in a requirements contract) or seller (in 
an output contract) may determine the quantity to be supplied. The contract might include 
a take-or-pay or minimum quantity clause, and that might be modified with a makeup 
clause. The agreement might even include a gross inequity, or hardship, clause that would 
allow a disgruntled party to appeal to an arbitrator or court to reset the price. The contract 
might have a mechanism that would allow one of the parties to terminate the agreement 
under certain circumstances 
  
 “The drafters of the 1950s probably did not contemplate 20 or 30 year contracts,” 
say White & Summers, “but they clearly contemplated contracts where performance 
would occur after the time for trial. Section 2-723 is designed to deal with at least one 
issue in such cases. It instructs the court to base damages on the ‘market price’ at the date 
that the aggrieved party learns of the repudiation.”65 
 
Section 2-723 provides no coherent answer to the question of how (or even if) future 
quantities should be determined. It ignores significant features of the contracts such as 
early termination rights and price redetermination rights. The decisions tend to focus on 
the price of the product—the difference between the contract and market price. There are 
obvious complications for determining each since both the price and quantity will 
typically not be fixed for the life of the contract. Even if that problem could somehow be 
resolved, it still puts the focus on the wrong question. The concern should not be with the 
change in the price of the product, but with the change in the value of the asset—the 
contract—at the time of the repudiation. The contract’s value encompasses all the 
nuances that the Section 2-723 inquiry fails to reach. 
 
The damages if the buyer were to repudiate should be the change in value of the 
contract at the moment of repudiation—the present value of the difference in the 
expected cash flows. If the expected future unit costs of production exceeded the 
expected prices, then the seller should shut the project down. Its loss would be the 
expected future revenues less the expected cost of producing that revenue—lost profit. 
So, for example, when the buyer (NIPSCO) repudiated a long-term coal purchase 
contract with Carbon County, Judge Posner found: “The loss to Carbon County from the 
breach of contract is simply the difference between (1) the contract price (as escalated 
over the life of the contract in accordance with the contract’s escalator provisions) times 
quantity, and (2) the cost of mining the coal over the life of the contract.”66 
 
If, however, the producer expected to continue production through the life of the 
contract, the damages—the change in the value of the contract—would be the difference 
                                                 
65 White & Summers, § 7-8. 
66 Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (NIPSCO) v. Carbon County Coal Co. 799 F.2d 265, 279 (7th Cir. 
1986).  The contract had a price adjustment clause and was for a fixed quantity per year. 
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between the expected future revenues at the time when the contract was repudiated and 
the expected future revenues given the new market conditions. Projecting those two 
streams would clearly be a difficult task. Nonetheless, it can be done. Tractebel Energy 
Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc.67 provides an illustration, but also suggests how 
imperfect the process can be. 
 
In November 2000, American Electric Power Company (AEP) entered into a Power 
Purchase and Sale Agreement (PPSA) with Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. (TEMI).  
AEP would build a cogeneration plant that would supply steam to Dow Chemical and 
electric power to TEMI. The PPSA term was for 20 years. Because Dow needed large 
quantities of steam, and because the steam and electricity were jointly produced, the 
contract required that TEMI take a substantial amount of electricity. The contract 
included a “must-take” provision. AEP spent about $500 million building the facility; 
before the facility was on line, the market for electricity collapsed and TEMI repudiated. 
 
Each side provided expert testimony on AEP’s lost profits.  AEP’s witness concluded 
that the present value of its losses over the twenty-year period was between $417 and 
$604 million with the most likely case being $520 million. TEMI’s expert claimed that 
AEP suffered no loss which, given the collapse of the electricity market, was implausible. 
The trial judge was not impressed by either expert: “I found both experts provided 
unreliable testimony and worse yet, it appeared to be clouded by their obvious advocacy, 
to paraphrase a popular show tune, on behalf of the lady they came in with.”68 But even if 
they had done impeccable work, he would not have accepted it; it would have been too 
speculative: 
In order to know what AEP’s revenues would be over the next twenty 
years, one would have to be able to presage a vast and varied body of 
facts. Any projection of lost profits would necessarily include assumptions 
regarding the price of electricity and the costs of operating over twenty 
years. One would also need to surmise what competing forms of energy 
such as coal and nuclear energy would cost over the same time period. 
Also factoring into this calculation are the political and regulatory 
developments over twenty years, population growth in the Entergy region, 
and technological advances affecting the production of power and related 
products. With so many unknown variables, these experts might have done 
as well had they consulted tealeaves or a crystal ball.69  
So, he concluded, the lost profits damages were too speculative and, hence, zero. The 
Court of Appeals disagreed. “The variables identified by the district court exist in every 
long-term contract. It is not the case that all such contracts may be breached with 
impunity because of the difficulty of accurately calculating damages.”70 The decision 
does not indicate how either expert determined the future prices or quantities; nor did it 
                                                 
67 487 F.3d 89, 109 (2d Cir. 2007). (Tractebel II) 
68 Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 6731(HB), 03 Civ. 6770(HB), 2005 
WL 1863853,  (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2005)  (Tractebel I, at *4) 
69 Tractebel I, at *11-12) 
70 Tractebel II, at 112 
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say how they might have dealt with the possibility that either party might exercise a right 
to terminate the contract. Nonetheless, the decision is consistent with the notion that the 
damages would be the change in the value of the contract after the collapse of the 
electricity market. 
 
Take-or-pay contracts present a different problem. In a take-or-pay the buyer agrees 
to pay in each period for a minimum quantity, even if it does not take it. A failure to take 
the minimum in a given period would not be a breach of the contract; the buyer would 
simply be exercising its option. However, a failure to pay would be a breach and the 
damages would be the contract price in that period multiplied by the difference between 
the amount taken and the minimum quantity. If the buyer repudiated its subsequent 
obligations, then there would be a breach. Damages would be for the future minimum 
obligation subject to the possibility that it could sell the goods to a third-party. The 
remedy would be the same as for Nipsco or Tractebel. The same remedy would hold if 
the contract set a minimum amount for, say, a three-year period. So, for example, in the 
well-known case of Lake River v Carborundum,71 if the three-year period had elapsed, 
the damages would be for the price multiplied by the shortfall, although Judge Posner 
held otherwise. If, however, the buyer anticipatorily repudiated the contract, the damage 
measure would have to take into account the seller’s ability to sell the goods to a third 
party. 
 
IV. The Golden Victory and Post-Breach Facts 
 
The House of Lords confronted the question of whether post-breach facts should 
be taken into account when assessing damages in The Golden Victory.72 Citing a century 
old non-contract case73 it concluded that they should: “Why should he listen to conjecture 
on a matter which has become an accomplished fact? Why should he guess when he can 
calculate? With the light before him, why should he shut his eyes and grope in the 
dark?”74 The Golden Victory was subsequently ratified by the Supreme Court in Bunge 
SA v. Nidera BV.75 The post-breach fact in each case was the occurrence of a force 
majeure event. Unfortunately, both decisions are wrong. Perhaps it is too late to do 
anything about it, but I hope that “with the light before them” the Court will see fit to 
reverse course in a future decision.  
 
In July 1998, the owner of the Golden Victory chartered the tanker to a Japanese 
company for seven years. The charter included a clause that was in use for all time 
charters for tankers likely to visit the Gulf:  
 
If war or hostilities break out between any two or more of the following 
countries: USA, former USSR, PRC, UK, Netherlands, Liberia, Japan, 
                                                 
71 Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985). For more detail, see Goldberg 
(2015, ch. 7) and Goldberg (2019, pp. x-y). 
72 Golden Strait Corp v Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory), [2007] UKHL 12 (691). 
73 Bwllfa and Merthyr Dare Steam Collieries (1891) Ltd v. Pontypridd Waterworks Co.   [1903] AC 426, 
431HL (E). 
74 At 718. 
75 [2015] UKSC 43. 
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Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, both owners and charterers shall 
have the right to cancel this charter. Either party, however, shall not be 
entitled to terminate this charter on account of minor and/or local military 
operation or economic warfare anywhere which will not interfere with the 
vessel's trade.76 
 
The hire rate was initially set at $31,500 per day, increasing by a formula that was 
not included in the decision. In addition, the owner would receive a share of the profits 
over the base rate. In December 2001, following a sharp decline in the market for ship 
charters, the charterer repudiated; three days later the owner accepted the repudiation. In 
a September 2002 interim declaratory award, the arbitrator found that there had been a 
breach and that the earliest contractual date for redelivery would have been in December 
2005. The damage measurement issue was not decided until October 2004. That gap 
turned out to be significant since the second Gulf War began in March 2003. Had the 
contract still been in effect, the war clause would have been triggered and the charterer 
would have exercised its right to terminate. 
 
 The owner claimed that the termination date for measuring damages should be 
December 2005. The charterer argued that, since it would have exercised its termination 
option in March 2003, it should only be liable for damages through March 2003. The 
arbitrator agreed, as did the judges in the commercial court, the Court of Appeal, and, 
finally, in the House of Lords (in a 3-2 split). The arbitrator took evidence from experts 
on whether in December 2001 the war was merely a possibility or was probable or 
inevitable. The owner argued that the “loss is crystallised at the date of breach and an 
arbitrator or court should not look at post-breach events in making the assessment. The 
only exception to this rule was where the subsequent event could be seen at the 
crystallisation date to be inevitable or ‘predestined.’”77 
 
Lord Bingham, in his dissent, noted that if the damages had been calculated at the 
time the liability decision had been made, the Gulf War would not yet have occurred and, 
presumably, the arbitrator would have had no difficulty awarding damages for the last 
two-plus years of the charter. Could the charterer then have come back to the arbitrator 
and asked for a refund for the last two years? Presumably the arbitrator and the majority 
would have rejected such a claim, perhaps invoking “finality.” But why make the remedy 
depend on the length of the damages phase of the proceedings?  War was only one of the 
many risks that might have impacted the value of the charter. If the market price for 
charters collapsed, should the charterer’s damages be increased to take into account the 
latest conditions? If not, which post-breach, pre-decision factors should a court take into 
account when reckoning damages?  
 
 The charter was an asset of the owner and the problem was to determine the value 
of the asset at the time of the breach with and without the breach. The complicated 
pricing formula—indexing and profit sharing—made that more difficult, but the 
complications were independent of the timing question. Lord Mance (Court of Appeal) 
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recognized that the contract was an asset, but failed to understand the implications: “But 
the element of uncertainty, resulting from the war clause, meant that the owners were 
never entitled to absolute confidence that the charter would run for its full seven-year 
period. They never had an asset which they could bank or sell on that basis.”78 That’s half 
right; the value of all assets is entirely determined by the future and the future is, by 
definition uncertain. That does not mean that the assets can’t be valued. We do it all the 
time. The majority wrongly suggested that the war clause made the duration of the 
charter (and therefore its value) uncertain: “Where there is a suspensive condition such as 
a war clause, however, the duration of the charter was always uncertain, depending on a 
contingency of the occurrence of an event which was by definition within the 
contemplation of the parties.”79 By that reasoning, every contract with a force majeure 
clause—indeed, every contract—would be at risk. 
 
 Valuing the asset would, by necessity, take into account the possibility that the 
war clause would come into play and that one of the parties would exercise its 
cancellation option. If at the time of the breach, war was a low probability event, the 
discount would have been minor. Conversely, if the breach occurred at the beginning of 
March 2003, the value of the asset would have been close to zero. A simple analogy 
might be helpful. Suppose a company is litigating a patent claim. If it were to win, the 
share value would be $100 and if it were to lose, the share value would be zero. If the 
chance of winning is 50:50, the value of the stock on the eve of decision is $50. Post-
decision it would be $0 or $100. Varying the probabilities would alter the stock price; if 
winning were “predestined,” the stock price would approach $100 and if it were 
exceedingly unlikely, it would approach $0. The likelihood of a future event at the time 
of the breach, whether remote, predestined, or something in between, is one of the 
determinants of the value of the asset. 
 
 The Lords’ failure to comprehend this point is illustrated in Lord Brown’s 
opinion: 
 
Shift the facts here and assume that the arbitrator had found, as at 
December 2001, a probability (or even merely a significant possibility) of 
(perhaps imminent) war breaking out in the Gulf, but that in fact, by the 
time damages finally came to be assessed, not only had war not broken out 
but all risk of it had disappeared—or, indeed, the assessment might not 
have taken place until the whole nominal term of the charterparty had 
expired. On the view taken by the minority of your Lordships, the 
damages award would have had to reflect a risk which never in fact 
eventuated, a conclusion in the circumstances, greatly to the owner's 
disadvantage. Yet that inescapably is the logic of the minority's 
approach.80  
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79 At 715. 
80 At 724-5. 
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And that is how it should be. Markets take future risk into account, incorporating 
the best information at the time of the breach. If the likelihood of the particular event 
changes over time or, as in this instance, the event comes to pass, the market will reflect 
those changes. If the news turns out to be better than had been anticipated (Brown’s no 
war scenario), the measured damages at the time of the breach would have been below 
the measurement at the time of the decision. And if the news turns out to be worse, as in 
the actual case, the measured damages at the time of breach would exceed those at the 
time of the decision. Whether the losses were probable or predestined would be 
determined by the market, not by after-the-fact expert testimony on predestination.  
 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed The Golden Victory in Bunge SA v. Nidera BV. 
Bunge (the seller) agreed to sell 25,000 metric tons of Russian milling wheat crop 2010, 
FOB Novorossiysk. The contract was entered into on June 10, 2010 with delivery to be 
made between August 23 and August 30. The contract price was $160 per metric ton but 
by August 11 the price of wheat on the world market had risen to between $280 and 
$285. On August 5 Russia introduced a legislative embargo on exports of wheat from its 
territory, which was to run from August 15 to December 31, 2010. The contract included 
a prohibition clause:  “In case of . . . any executive or legislative act done by or on behalf 
of the government of the country of origin  . . . restricting export, . . . any such restriction 
shall be deemed by both parties to apply to this contract  . . . and to that extent this 
contract or any unfulfilled portion thereof shall be cancelled.”81 On August 9 the seller 
jumped the gun, notifying the buyer that because of the embargo the contract was 
cancelled; the buyer rejected this on August 11, claiming that the seller had repudiated 
the contract, and it then accepted the repudiation. The seller then offered to reinstate the 
contract, but the buyer claimed that it was too late. It claimed damages for the difference 
between the contract price and the market price of wheat on August 11, US$3,062,500.  
 
The arbitration panel found that the premature invocation of the prohibition clause 
amounted to a breach which the buyer had accepted. It was possible that Mr. Putin might 
have changed his mind before August 30, it held, so it would have been possible that 
Bunge could have performed. In the subsequent stages of litigation that finding was 
upheld and I will not pursue that issue. The remaining issue concerned damages—had the 
buyer suffered any damages and, if so, how would they be measured? Should the fact that 
the embargo remained in place after August 30 be taken into account? 
 
The initial arbitration panel refused to award damages, holding that the buyer had 
suffered none. The decision took into account post-breach information, namely that the 
embargo remained in effect in August 23-30, so the contract would have been excused. 
The arbitration Appeal Board reversed, measuring damages on the date of breach 
(US$3,062,500) and ignoring the subsequent information. On appeal the Judge was 
Nicholas Hamblen who had been losing counsel in The Golden Victory. He affirmed the 
decision and distinguished The Golden Victory by noting that it involved an installment 
contract whereas the Bunge-Nidera contract was a one-off.82 His decision was affirmed 
by a unanimous Court of Appeal. However, in a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court 
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reversed, awarding the buyer nominal damages of $5.83  
 
None of the decisions say what happened to the wheat. Did Bunge manage to sell 
it on the world market prior to August 15? Could it? Or did it have to sell in Russia at 
whatever price prevailed in that market after August 30? Russian prices were below the 
world price at the time of the initial contract and at the time of the breach. As it 
happened, the Russian price differential remained roughly the same while the embargo 
was in effect.84 The post-embargo Russian price, while lower than the world price, was 
substantially higher than the contract price. So Bunge made a substantial profit regardless 
of whether it sold in Russia or in the world market. Doctrinally that might not matter, but 
there is at least a strong hint in the Supreme Court decision that it was influenced by 
concern for unfairness to Bunge if it were to have to pay damages. In fact, Bunge had 
made a significant profit. 
 
 The contract was on GAFTA’s 49 standard form contract, designed for contracts 
for the delivery of goods from central and Eastern Europe in bulk or bags. (GAFTA is the 
Grain and Feed Trade Association.) The contract included a “default clause” that set out 
how damages should be measured in the event of a default. To avoid confusion, I will call 
this a “damage clause,” reserving the term default to mean the rule that would apply in 
the absence of contract language that would govern the situation. Damages would be the 
contract-market differential at the time of the breach. This appeared to conflict with the 
Justices’ view that the compensation principle would result in no damages since the 
embargo remained in force during the delivery period.  Lord Sumption resolved this by 
claiming that the damage clause somehow did not cover this situation: “[I]n my opinion, 
clause 20 neither addresses nor excludes the consideration of supervening events (other 
than price movements) which operate to reduce or extinguish the loss.”85  
 
The damage clause read: “The damages payable shall be based on, but not limited to 
the difference between the contract price and either the [cover price] or upon the actual or 
estimated value of the goods on the date of default.”86 The arbitration panel (and, 
presumably, the court) interpreted that to mean the price of the goods on the date of the 
breach, but there is ambiguity as to what that is. It should be the forward price of wheat 
on August 1l, the day of the breach, for wheat to be delivered between August 23 and 
August 30. But which wheat? All the judges appear to have assumed that it was the 
forward price on August 11 of wheat in the world market. But that makes no sense. It is 
inconsistent with the existence of the prohibition clause which only applied to Russian 
wheat. The relevant price should be the price of Russian wheat in the world market. That 
price would reflect the likelihood that the embargo might not be lifted before August 30. 
The “estimated value of the goods on the date of default” would have to take into account 
the likelihood on August 11 that the embargo would be lifted and Russian wheat would 
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have been deliverable outside Russia in the last week of August.  
 
The decisions do not say why Bunge jumped the gun. Perhaps it was just careless 
talk and Bunge had no expectation of benefitting from an early termination. That is at 
least plausible, given its attempt to retract. If, however, a proper inquiry concluded that as 
of August 11 it was not feasible to sell the wheat to the world market by August 15, and 
the probability that Mr. Putin would change his mind before August 30 was very close to 
zero, then the contract value at the time of the breach would have taken this into account. 
The price of Russian wheat in the world market for delivery before the end of August 
would not have been around $280; it would have been close to zero. Certainly it would 
have been well below the contract price of $160. This measure would be akin to the 
damages in The Golden Victory context had the charterer repudiated in early March 1993. 
The probability of war would have been high in the one case, as was the continuation of 
the embargo in the other, and the contract in either case would have been discounted to 
close to zero. The Supreme Court’s result, nominal damages, was correct. But the path to 
that result was wrong. The court could have arrived there while still honoring the damage 
clause and rejecting The Golden Victory.  
 
In Bunge, Lord Sumption rejected the notion of the contract-as-asset:  
 
The minority [in The Golden Victory]. . . considered that one should value 
not the chartered service which would actually have been performed, but 
the charterparty itself, assessed at the time that it was terminated, by 
reference to the terms of a notional substitute concluded as soon as 
possible after the termination of the original. That would vary, not 
according to the actual outcome, but according to the outcomes which 
were perceived as possible or probable at the time that the notional 
substitute contract was made. . . . [T]he common law [principles] are 
concerned with the price of the goods or services which would have been 
delivered under the contract. They are not concerned with the value of the 
contract as an article of commerce in itself.”87  
 
He gave no reason as to why the change in the value of the contract should not be 
relevant.  
 
In The Golden Victory and Bunge, the court focused on the virtues of resolving 
the uncertainty. “With the light before him, why should he shut his eyes and grope in the 
dark?” The downside of this is that the decisions increase uncertainty in a different 
dimension. If some subsequent events would result in reckoning damages at the moment 
of decision, but not others, then each party will have an incentive to argue for the rule 
favoring it when it is no longer behind the veil of ignorance, and courts will have to 
determine on an ad hoc basis which cases warrant taking subsequent events into account.  
As Summers & Kramer note: 
 
The formulae put forward for departing from the breach date rule are 
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hopelessly vague. According to three leading House of Lords decisions, 
the breach date rule may be departed from “if to follow it would give rise 
to injustice”, “where it is necessary in order adequately to compensate the 
plaintiff”, or where it is “necessary or just to do so in order to give effect 
to the compensatory principle.” And so, on the conventional approach, 
judges are presented with an apparently unguided discretion which rests 
on unspecified concepts of justice and compensation.88 
The problem with The Golden Victory and its spawn is, as Summers & Kramer say, the 
unguided discretion and the ad hoc exceptions it allows. 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
The premise of this article is that the default rule for determining direct damages 
when the buyer or seller fails to perform should be the change in the value of the contract 
at the time of the breach. For standardized commodities traded in thick markets this is 
straightforward, the only question being whether the new contract price is the spot price 
or the forward price. I have applied the notion to problems in both American and English 
law.  
 
In the United States, one problem is that there is an apparent difference between two 
UCC remedies, the contract/market differential and cover. However, once we recognize 
that cover, or any subsequent contract, should be treated as evidence of the market price, 
not a separate remedy, the problem goes away. To be clear, there is no reason why there 
has to be any subsequent transaction. If the buyer were to choose not to replace the 
transaction, the damages should be determined by finding the market price. 
Correspondingly, in England, the Sale of Goods Act appears to distinguish between cases 
in which there is an available market and those where there is not. The courts have 
proffered a number of unsatisfactory definitions of an available market, but have not 
really come to grips with the notion that the exercise is irrelevant. Again, the problem is 
to determine the price at the time of the breach, regardless of whether the non-breaching 
party entered into a subsequent transaction.   
 
The second problem concerned the role of post-breach information. In the United 
States the cover question is also implicated. The evidentiary quality of a cover transaction 
weakens as the gap between breach and the alleged cover transaction grows. American 
courts have come to different conclusions with regard to an anticipatory repudiation. 
While some would argue for using the price at the time of performance, others would 
look to the price when the repudiation was accepted. I have argued that the appropriate 
price would be the forward price when the repudiation was accepted, rather than the spot 
price. In the more complicated cases of long-term contracts, the value of the contract 
captures all the relevant features of the contract—variable price and quantity, early 
termination rights, etc. 
                                                 
88 Andrew Summers & Adam Kramer. “There is no ‘breach date rule’: mitigation, difference in value and 
date of assessment,” 130 Law Quarterly Review 259, 261 (2014). 
 




In England, while the general rule has been to use the time of the breach, the 
Supreme Court has endorsed an exception. If a force majeure event would have occurred 
between the time of breach and the performance date, in The Golden Victory and Bunge, 
the highest court took into account whether the force majeure event occurred. In both 
cases the court failed to appreciate that the likelihood of the occurrence would have been 
factored in to determine the market price at the time of the breach. In the former case the 
probability was very low and the price was likely not discounted. In the latter case, the 
likelihood was extremely high. Had the court recognized that the relevant price was for 
Russian wheat sold outside Russia, the price would have been heavily discounted so that 
the damages would have been zero. 
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